The Moral Subject of Property by Rose, Carol M.
HeinOnline -- 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1897 2006-2007
THE MORAL SUBJECT OF PROPERTY
CAROL M. ROSE*
I ain't the woman in red, I ain't the girl next door
But if somewhere in the middle's what you're lookin' for
I'm that kind of girl ....
MATRACA BERGIRONNIE SAMOSET, I'm That Kind of Girl,
sung by Patty Loveless on
ON DOWN THE LINE (MCA Records 1990).
1. INTRODUCTION: THAT KIND OF GIRL
Utopians do not like private property. In one of the most
notorious incidents of the Reformation era, militant Anabaptist
preachers called for their followers to establish a Kingdom of the
Saints in the town of Muenster in western Germany, gathering
supporters in the early 1530s and finally taking over the town from
the ruling Prince-Bishop in 1534.1 The supposedly saintly Kingdom
followed, in which a key element, though not an uncontroversial
one, was the abolition of private property.2 According to these
Anabaptist leaders, their new converts were without sin. For these
earthly saints, the self-regarding payoffs of ''Mine'' and the
discipline of,'Thine" were, as one leader said, "abominations."a Love
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1. NORMAN COHN, THE PuRsUIT OF THE MILLF:NNIUM: REVOLUTIONARY MILLENARIANS
AND MYSTICAL ANARCHISTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 255-56, 260-63 (rev. ed. 1970).
2. [d. at 265-66.
3. [d.
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and the spirit of community would induce the Saints to work and
share selflessly, free from the grubby hoarding, hawking, and wage
counting that accompany property rights.4 As a matter of fact, they
were not supposed to need conventional marriage either, a doctrine
that worked out quite conveniently for at least one of the Anabap-
tist leaders, Jan Bockelson, who ditched an old wife and acquired
fIfteen new ones.5 But the community of property-and the almost-
community ofspouses-was not to last. The Prince-Bishop returned
with an army, assisted by a number of other alarmed German
princes and the townspeople themselves, who had become dis-
mayed at their increasingly tyrannical leaders.6 The besiegers
turned out the Anabaptists in mid-1535, executing Bockelson and
a number of other Saints with the exquisitely painful means and
public drama reserved for sixteenth-century revolutionaries.7 Along
with the bishop's restoration came the return of laws, marriage,
and property-constraining institutions that were thought more
compatible with the human state offallenness-while the Anabap-
tists eventually retreated to more quietist versions of their faith. 8
Their descendants now reside in Pennsylvania and other places as
Mennonites and Hutterites.9
More modern Utopians have not always been quite so confIdent
about their own salvation as Bockelson and his followers, but they
too have tended to fInd private property distasteful and an impedi-
ment to perfectionist aspirations. Nineteenth century American
utopian communities typically restrained private ownership in
various ways, in the expectation that the community members
would share at least with one another, although perhaps not with
the world at large.1o Property, it seems, concedes too much to self-
4. Id. at 266.
5. Id. at 269-70.
6. Id. at 277·80.
7.Id.
8. Id. at 280.
9.Id.
10. See, e.g., IRA L. MANDELKER, RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND UTOPIA IN NINETEENTH
CENTURYAMERICA 125-27 (1984) (describing renunciation ofprivate property within utopian
Oneida community, though the community retained property insofar as it sold goods to
outsiders). Interestingly enough, the Oneida community, like the sixteenth-century followers
of Bockelson, also practiced a kind of group marriage. See MAREN LoCKWOOD CARDEN,
ONEIDA: UTOPIAN COMMUNlTYTOMODERN CORPORATION xiii·xiv, 4 (1969) (concerning Oneida
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interest, or perhaps just to old-fashioned sinfulness, to have a good
reputation among perfectionists.
On the other hand, property also presents some problems to those
who ascribe too thoroughly to the idea that human beings are
merely self-interested-or sinful. William Blackstone famously
noted how the imagination and affections of mankind are stirred by
the right of property-that "dominion" over things that "one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."ll But
what is so remarkable about that? Ifone believes in the dominance
of self-interest, what is to wonder that each person might claim to
exclude all others from something he or she wants? Hoggishness is
to be expected from sinners, is it not? No, what should truly strike
the imagination is the fact that others-presumably equally hoggish
others-pay the slightest attention to any such claims. A right of
property would be no dominion at all unless those other persons
backed off-playing the "chicken" role to the owner's ''hawk,'' as the
game theoretical language puts it.12 This relieves the owner of the
enervating requirement to guard her property all the time, so that
she can actually improve and use it. That is to say, claims to
property only make sense in a social context where there is some
level of cooperative behavior: if any given subject is to have control
over any given object, others must understand the signals of
ownership and acquiesce in them. 13
These signals of ownership are understood and respected much
of the time. They do not always succeed, but often they do, thanks
in large part to human forbearance from the impulse to take the
money and run. For those convinced of human depravity- other-
wise known, by some, as "rationality"-that fact should be the true
wonder of Blackstonian claims of dominion. A property regime
would be impossible, an unsolvable n-person "Prisoners' Dilemma,"
characteristics and Noyes' claim to perfection).
11. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *2 (Univ. ofehi.
Press 1979) (1766).
12. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Development
ofInstitutions in the California Gold Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114, 133-34 (2001) (analyzing
property relations as a series of "chicken-hawk" games, with the owner taking hawk role).
13. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 84-85
(1985).
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if everyone behaved in the presumptive piggish manner all the
time.14 Instead, we have property regimes that rest on an underly-
ing thread of cooperative behavior that is quite out of line with a
presumption of total moral fallenness.
One may understand the basic moral subject of property regimes
as the practicioner of a kind of second-best morality. This morality
does not presume saintliness, but it also is not made for total
sinners; she is neither the girl next door nor the woman in red.15
The common law of property details the second-best morality
expected of "that kind of girl," both as owner and as nonowner. As
a nonowner, she is expected to ask permission of an owner and not
just take things without consent, even when the owner's refusal
seems unreasonable.16 Nor can she usually foist an improvement on
the owner unless the owner consents.17 In her role as owner, on the
other hand, although she has a wide latitude with her belongings,
she cannot use them in ways that aggravate her neighbors in
unusual ways.IS More particularly, she cannot use her property
14. Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative
Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37,48-53 (1990).
15. In an earlier work I called her ''Mom,'' to designate a person interested in the well-
being of others but not a fool about her own interests, either. Id. at 43-48, 50.
16. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997) (upholding
large punitive damage judgment against trucker who crossed property after owner's explicit
refusal).
17. For example, the doctrine of "ameliorative waste" may make a tenant liable for
altering an owner's property even if the alteration adds to the property's value. See 8
RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ONREAL PROPERTY, § 56.05[1][c] (Michael Allan Wolfed., 2005)
(discussing leading case ofMelms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 79 N.W. 738 (Wis. 1899), and noting
that modern historic preservation makes doctrine more sympathetic). Similarly, the doctrine
of "accessions," permitting an improver to keep an improved object, is sharply limited by the
requirement that the improver make a "blameless" mistake and pay compensation. See
DeAngelo v. Brazauskas, 655 N.E.2d 165, 165-66 (N.Y. 1995) (permitting equitable relief to
contractor who mistakenly built house on wrong lot, by enabling him to remove house upon
compensation and remediation, contrary to usual accession doctrine remedy which would
give house to owner of mistakenly improved lot). In a contemporary example, "squeegee
guys," persons who wash windshields while cars are stopped at traffic lights and then
demand payment, serve as a metaphor for extortion and urban disorder. See, e.g., Michael
Cooper, Mayor Urges Plan for Drastic Cuts and Tax Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,2002, at
Al (describing New York mayor Michael Bloomberg's reassurance that tight budget would
not mean return of squeegee guys).
18. See, e.g., Middlesex Co. v. McCue, 21 N.E. 230, 231 (Mass. 1889) (describing nuisance
as a deviation below ordinary usage); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 729-33
(1973) (proposing land use regulatory standards that build on normal behavior standards
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maliciously simply to spite another.19 Spite only escalates wasteful
retaliation, in which each side expends resources just to ruin the
other party's things, resulting in a double loss for the society at
large. Moreover, property regimes require that on some occasions,
especially in emergency situations, the owner must yield to the
nonowner who encroaches on her property.20
Like the common law itself, the theoretical names for property
practices reflect the second-best character of the morality expected
in property regimes, encapsulated in phrases like "self-interest
rightly understood,"21 "tit for tat,"22 or "everyday Kantianism."23
Aside from the fact that some people do not abide even by this
second-best morality, however, the trouble with this moral middle
ground is that it is a large and sometimes ambiguous space. Take
the issue of spite or malice, for example: was the owner really
acting maliciously toward the neighbor when she built a fence that
totally blocked the view from his basement window and then poured
water onto the plants there? Or was she merely putting up a kind
of trellis on which to grow her vines?24 Or take the case of emer-
gency: is a potentially dangerous detour enough of a necessity to
permit a trucker to drive across a lot in spite of the landowners's
implicit in nuisance law).
19. See, e.g., Bar Due v. Cox, 190 P. 1056, 1057-58 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920) (ruling that
a ten-foot board fence blocking neighbor's window had to be removed or modified because its
construction was motivated by malice).
20. Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 188-89 (Vt. 1908) (classic torts case permitting boat
operator to tie up at pier of another in case of storm, so long as user paid damage); see also
Campbell v. Race, 61 Mass. (6 Cush.) 408, 412-13 (1851) (stating that road user could make
detour onto private property around impassible spot so long as deviation caused as little
damage as possible, describing doctrine as an "incidental burden" that a property owner
should expect in a "civilized community").
21. See 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 121-24 (phillips Bradley ed.,
Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Kropf 1945) (commenting on centrality of"self interest rightly
understood" in American commerce and politics).
22. See ROBERT AxELROD, THE EvOLUTION OF COOPERATION 13-14 (1984) (analyzing the
development of cooperation among "tit-for-tat" players of a Prisoners' Dilemma game, who
begin with a cooperative move and thereafter reciprocate the move of the opposite player,
including refusal to cooperate further with noncooperators).
23. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 192-93 (1989)
(describing "everyday Kantian" as one who determines her behavior with the
consequentialist question, "What if everyone did that?'').
24. See Bar Due, 190 P. at 1057 (answering that evidence showed malice).
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objection?25 Then too, just how wide is the owner's latitude to carry
out her preferences? Can she join with her neighbors, for example,
in a set of agreements to exclude minorities or disabled persons
from the neighborhood?26
Some cases like these are decided in favor of the owners and
some against. Perhaps because of their ambiguities, and perhaps
also because we deal with property virtually constantly, property as
an institution raises an unusually large number of moral com-
plaints.27 Why should anyone recognize and acquiesce to other
people's claims of exclusive dominion over anything? This question
need not derive from hoggish self-interest, or simply from the
intruder or the thief who wants to take the goodies and run; rather,
this question originates from the opposite direction, namely that of
the perfectionist. The perfectionist might ask, is the institution of
property morally worthy enough to command the respect and
forbearance upon which it depends?
The remainder of this Essay explores that question, pursuing it
in several areas in which moral objections to property frequently
arise, and exploring as well the explanations that property propo-
nents give. The argument of this Essay is that the moral objections
25. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997) (answering no). Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith use the Jacque case as a central example of the moral intuition in
favor of property's exclusivity. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of
Property, 48 WM. & MARy L. REV. 1849, 1871-74 (2007). My own view is that enough cases
have relaxed exclusivity claims that the moral dominance ofexclusivity, although important,
is somewhat less monolithic in the common law of property than these authors suggest. See,
e.g., supra note 20 and accompanying text.
26. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that racially restrictive covenants
are not legally enforceable, but not illegal if purely voluntary); Crane Neck Ass'n v. N.Y.
CitylLong Island Servs. Group, 460 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984) (refusing on grounds of public
policy to enforce covenant against group home for the mentally disabled).
27. It should be noted that tort law presumes much the same moral character that
property law does: one who is "reasonable" but not saintly; someone who meets but does not
necessarily exceed a community average in courage, prudence, and judgment. See FOWLER
V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAw OF TORTS § 16.2 (2d ed. 1986). Moreover, one character who
makes an appearance in tort law is the person who stops to help at an accident; though under
no legal requirement, she is present often enough that others should look out for her. See,
e.g., Solomon v. Schuell, 457 N.W.2d 669, 682-83 (Mich. 1990) (describing rescue doctrine).
Nevertheless, simply because torts occur in accidental situations, the characters in them are
not as constantly subject to observation and critique as those in property transactions.
Thanks to Ben Zipursky for bringing to my attention the similarities between the moral
characters assumed in torts and property law.
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to the institution of property generally are drawn from the sense
that property concedes too much to human self-interest. The
responses, on the other hand, generally take a form that common
lawyers would have called confession and avoidance: property law
does so for some larger good. Indeed, even when conventional
understandings of property require the property owner to give
ground, as in the spite cases, they do so from the perspective of the
larger public utility at least as much as from the perspective of
private morality. And that is the point: these arguments and
responses in certain ways do not meet each other. Instead, they pit
concerns for individual morality against justifications based on
public welfare, which is a very different matter.28 Whatever the
inadequacies ofthe utilitarian response to fIrst-best or perfectionist
moral complaints, however, I will argue that there is a humaneness
in the second-best position that in some ways allows it to call the
mst-best position into question.
II. MORAL OBJECTIONS TO PROPERTY
Where, then, does property come under moral attack? This occurs
in many places, but this Essay will concentrate on three somewhat
overlapping loci: acquisition (where it is argued that property is
based on wrongful acts of acquisition), distribution (where it is
argued that property is unequally and unfairly distributed), and
commodification (where it is argued that treating things as property
undermines their true meaning). Other issues might have been
raised, such as externality (where it is argued that property rights
cause uncompensated harm to others), or even exclusivity itself
(where it is argued that exclusive rights throw up barriers between
people). I leave these to one side, however, for slightly different
reasons: externality, because this issue is already so widely
discussed in other literature; and exclusivity, because many of the
28. Cf. JOSEPHWIlllAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 106 (2000)
(noting divide between rights-based and efficiency-based discussions of property, criticizing
both for ignoring role that property law plays in structuring social relations); JEREMY
WALDRON, THE RIGHTTO PRIvATE PROPERTY 12-14 (1988) (describing disjunct between rights-
based and utilitarian arguments for property).
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moral questions about exclusivity come up in the three issues under
discussion here.
A. Acquisition
People who read Blackstone's famous sentence about property's
marvelous claims of exclusive dominion29 seldom go on to read the
rest of the paragraph. If they did, they would find that in the next
few sentences Blackstone sharply qualifies his own marveling, and
instead expresses great uneasiness about whether people really do
have good reasons to respect ownership claims.3o Blackstone's
unease springs from the uncertainty involved in acquisition: where
did those ownership claims come? As Blackstone observed, people
do not like to think about this question too much, because it could
cast doubt on the justice of their own claims.31
Blackstone had several answers for worries of this kind. First, he
basically admonished everyone to forget about these fears and let
sleeping dogs lie.32 Proudhon, who described property as theft,
would soon reject this advice as would Marx, who said much the
same in his acid comments on original acquisition.33 Second,
Blackstone told a little narrative illustrating the much more
convincing argument that property rights do a lot ofgood, whatever
their original source, and however they may be passed down.34
Then, and third, he launched into an exquisitely detailed descrip-
tion of property rights as they then existed, perhaps in an effort to
effectuate the first admonition and to help people forget to ask
these troubling questions.35
The second of Blackstone's answers, the little story to show
property's larger benefits, is the relevant one here. The tale begins




33. See 1 KARL MARx, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 713-15 (Frederick
Engels ed., Int'l Publishers 1967) (1887) (describingoriginal acquisition as based on force and
fraud); PIERRE JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT Is PROPERTY'? AN ENQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF
RIGHT AND OF GOVERNMENT 11-15 (Benjamin R. Tucker trans., Howard Fertig 1966) (1840)
(asserting that property is theft).
34. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at **2-12.
35.Id.
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in the mists of time past, when supposedly all things were held in
common. Property then emerged as the world grew more populous
and resources grew scarcer, and as people wanted to do things now
for the sake of rewards in the future. 36 As Blackstone rhetorically
asked, who would till today if he could not reap later?37 And so, as
he put it, "[n]ecessity begat property": property emerged, appar-
ently because people needed it.38
This story is less than persuasive as an historical explanation for
property's origins and development. It has some problems on the
analytic front as well, because it assumes both that people are self-
interested and that they are cooperative enough to exercise
forbearance about other people's claimed rights.39 But the greater
significance of the story is its moral justification for property.
Indeed, it recounts one of the most important and prevalent of all
moral justifications for property: property is the foundation stone
of economic well-being.40
Blackstone's story effectively describes the basic moral subject so
common in property: the person who is self-interested enough to
need property as an inducement to labor, but who is also coopera-
tive enough to eschew grabbing other peoples' claimed rights. Once
we are given such a subject, with all her internal logical contradic-
tions, property as an institution makes a lot of sense. In theological
terms, property provides the link between sinful human beings and
the Biblical injunction to labor.41 The essential gist of a property
regime is to let people take the payoffs from their work and
investment, and at the same time to identify owners so that
everyone can trade instead offighting. Trade encourages specializa-
tion and even greater gains from investment and exchange. This
virtuous spiral of work, investment, and trade makes everyone
better off in the standard property rationale.
The moral question is whether this expected social good out-
weighs whatever injustices may have accompanied the original
36. Id. at *7.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *8.
39. Id. at **7-8.
40. Id. at *8.
41. See at **2-3.
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acquisition ofproperty rights. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
property theorists were much fIxed on the issue of whether all
humankind had to agree to anyone person's removal of private
property from the great commons that God had provided. Hugo
Grotius said yes, John Locke said no, and Blackstone called this "[a]
dispute that savours too much of nice and scholastic refInement!"42
Even though the terms of the debate have changed, the acquisi-
tion question is still relevant, though in somewhat different arenas.
Property, as an institution, requires stability in people's expecta-
tions about their own and other people's claims. This is why
property law has several claims-clearing devices that substitute
Owner #2 for Owner #1 when the claims of Owner #1 have not been
suffIciently publicized, and when most people think that Owner #2
is the true owner even though she is not. Adverse possession is a
classic example ofthis sort ofclaims-clearing device. Unfortunately,
Owner #2's claims may have arisen in dubious circumstances or
even through force or fraud, and that fact can undermine confIdence
in the entire institution.43 Contemporary Russia is a case in point,
where major capitalist fIgures are widely regarded as the benefIcia-
ries of insider favoritism and horrifIcally shady practices.44 Should
their great wealth be recognized, simply for the sake of getting on
with things and letting a modern economy unroll? Or would some
kind of redistribution actually lead to greater stability?
Historic injustices create another source of unease: Palestinians
vis-a.-vis Israelis, former East European landowners vis-a.-vis the
42. Id. at *8 (describing views of Hugo Grotius and John Locke, among others, and
adding hi~ own comment); see also WALDRON, supra note 28, at 147-53 (describing
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century debate over the emergence of property from supposed
original common ownership).
43. See, for example, Ewing v. Burnett, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41, 42-44 (1837), a leading
adverse possession case in which a wealthy neighbor succeeded in taking property claimed
by a poorer man. See also LINDA S. PARKER, NATIVE AMERICAN ESTATE: THE STRUGGLE OVER
INDIAN AND HAWAIIAN LANDs 115-19 (1989) (detailing use of adverse possession by large
landowners to dispossess traditional small Native Hawaiian holdings, often with
questionable notice and Native Hawaiians' distrust of courts).
44. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Anna Tarassova, Institutional Reform in Transition: A
Case Study of Russia, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 211, 218-20 (2003) (describing post-Soviet
Russian "oligarchs"' takeover of major parts of resources and economy, leading to popular
doubts about political and economic reforms); see also DAVID E. HOFFMAN, THE OLIGARCHS:
WEALTH AND POWER IN THE NEW RUSSIA (2002) (providing biographical information and a
description of the rise of a newly wealthy group).
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newcomers under Soviet rule, numerous indigenous groups vis-a-vis
the settler societies that displaced them, descendants of slaves vis-
a-vis the descendants of slave-owners. Settling all those scores
could be hugely disruptive, and the passage of time itself makes
proposed settlements morally ambiguous, because the original
victims and perpetrators often are no longer on the scene. Why
charge A in favor of B, when neither A nor B were personally
involved in the past injustice? Moreover, settlements could leave
open the origins ofthe displaced persons' own prior claims, as in the
case of former aristocrats' plantations in East Germany.45 Just
whom did their ancestors displace, far back in the Middle Ages?46
And so on back in time.
The age-old acquisition problem is not very salient to most
property regimes, however, even though it bubbles hotly at the
center in some locales. Issues of this kind usually become periph-
eral because we basically follow Blackstone's advice: we forget
about the questionable origins of title. The common law of property
encourages this forgetting process, for example, by creating the
legal fiction of the "lost grant" for some moderately aggressive but
uncontested resource use, or by treating the period of roughly
twenty years as a time period for which "the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary."47 By forgetting about origins we can
keep on acquiring, investing, trading, and generally making
45. For a discussion ofpost-Soviet property issues, see Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional
Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REV. 475, 541-49 (1991) (describing the potentially
"explosive" controversies and the decision not to restore East German property confiscated
between 1945-49 from the aristocratic "Junkers" and other landowners); id. at 549-62
(describingfurther controversy over decisions to restore property confiscated by East German
government after 1949); see also Michael Heller & Christopher Serkin, RevaluingRestitution:
From the Talmud to Postsocialism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1397-412 (1999) (describing
nationalistic and ethnic motivations and other perverse incentives in postsocialist
restitutions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary).
46. See Hans Rosenberg, The Rise ofthe Junkers in Brandenburg·Prussia 1410·1653, 49
AM. HIST. REV. 1,4-15 (1943) (describing the emergence ofthe East German aristocratic class
in late medieval and early modem era).
47. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 696·97 (6th ed. 2006) (describing
development ofthe doctrine of prescription); see also Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic
Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 15-16 (1992) (arguing that the law recognizes that an original
owner's sense of entitlement "fade[s)" while later possessor's attachment grows over time).
But see Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 72
IND. L.J. 723, 740-43 (1997) (disputing Waldron's arguments in case of indigenous cultural
goods).
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ourselves wealthier. The larger public good of stable claims
normally outweighs the private lapses that were entailed in some
of those claims.
But not surprisingly, on occasion the situation is reversed: unjust
acquisitions may seem so gross as to eat away even the middle
ground morality that makes property regimes possible. Ifyou think
that all those who succeed are thieves, why not be a thief yourself?
That rhetorical question turns tit-for-tat practitioners into larce-
nists. Under such circumstances, public morality-even in quest of
stability for property~ould require some kind of restitutionary
gesture, or at least some acknowledgment of past injustice.48
The perception of unjust initial acquisition may also help to
explain the unusual willingness of many ordinary people to flout
intellectual property claims. Intellectual property (lP) is supposed
to serve most of the same utilitarian functions as other kinds of
property, incentivizing rights-holders to develop creative projects
and identifying owners so that trade is possible, and with trade, the
dissemination of artistic and inventive achievements. But That
Kind of Girl sometimes violates IP claims with an insouciance that
is quite out ofcharacter with her usual respect for property, at least
insofar as her uses are personal and not commerciaL Why? Because
she does not think that IP really applies to noncommercial uses.49
Mter all, as Jessica Litman points out with respect to copyright, she
senses that most of the relevant law is cooked up by and for
commercial interests, without respect to the impact on the rest of
us.50 If some copyright monitor tries, say, to stop her friends from
48. For discussion of a current controversy, reparations for enslavement, see Hanoch
Dagan et aI., Symposium: The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1135,
1135-36 (2004) (describing the variety of views in the symposium). For an example of one
small recognition of past injustice, see LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RIGHTING AWRONG: JAPANESE
AMERICANS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1988, at 51, 58 (1993)
(describing passage of the 1987 statute to redress personal harms, but not property harms,
done to Japanese Americans during World War II); see also SINGER, supra note 28, at 190-95
(describing "Dilemmas of Reparation''); Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and
Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1686-99 (1999) (describing reparations for long-past
injustice as expressions of "regret," rather than inducement to seek useful changes in the
law).
49. Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19,
23-24 (1996).
50. Id. Litman develops this depiction of copyright law further in her book, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET (2001).
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singing "Over the Rainbow" at the corner bar, she is very much
annoyed. She regards this kind of rights-claiming as overreaching,
a grab for something outside the range of what might have been
justly acquired, namely commercial protection.51
Indeed until relatively recently, her view was not actually so far
off from the way IP rights were actually enforced, perhaps because
personal uses did not seem to threaten IP incentives very much.52
The advent of the duplicating machine, the video recorder, and
especially digital copying have put great pressure on this tacit
understanding of the just reach of IP rights, however, because
massively enhanced opportunities for personal copying can have
enormous commercial ramifications. That Kind ofGirl is smart and
cooperative enough to appreciate this, as is evidenced by her
willingness to buy iTunes when they became available, even though
some ofher counterparts continue to look for ways to circumvent IP
rules.53
Scholarship about IP has intensified exponentially over the last
decade, and a central reason is that in this area of property,
technology has destabilized the always slightly vague boundary
between justly acquired, socially useful IP rights on the one side,
and overreaching on the other. Blackstone wanted everyone just to
forget about the justice of original acquisition for the sake of
current social utility, but modern controversies suggest that those
sleeping dogs can wake up unexpectedly.
B. Distribution
Justice, as Aristotle said, is commonly thought to be a kind of
equality,54 but a property regime almost guarantees that the dis-
51. For a somewhat similar imbroglio, see Elisabeth Bumiller, Battle Hymns Around
Campfires: ASCAP Asks Royalties from Girl Scouts, and Regrets It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1996, at B1 (describing public relations disaster for royalty collection organization over
request for royalties from Girl Scouts for singing "Happy Birthday to You").
52. Litman, supra note 49, at 40-41.
53. See, e.g., Constance S. Hawke, Piracy and Protocols: Handling Internet Piracy on
University Networks, 209 Enuc. L. REP., 17, 26 (2006) (noting great success of online music
sales, including Apple's iTunes, but also continuing piracy issues in universities).
54. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OFARISTOTLE 129 (Ernest Barker ed. & trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1962) (noting that ordinary, as well as philosophical, usage describes justice as a kind
of equality, though leaving the question of equality with respect to what).
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tribution of wealth will not be equal: some people will get richer
than others. To be sure, there are wealth inequalities in dirigiste
regimes as well, as in the old Soviet Union, but at least in theory
they are likely to be considered flaws rather than systematic
institutional features. Not so in property regimes: ownership's
economic advantage is that it "internalizes externalities," focusing
the rewards and penalties of planning and investment on the
owners themselves.55 Some owners will do better than others, and
the resulting inequality acts as a disciplinary school for capitalist
improvement. 56 One who wants to succeed can identify others'
successes and emulate their behavior. Riches are the goal and
poverty the goad, and the differences between them form the engine
that drives people to work, invest, plan, trade, and in general to
take the efforts that increase the probabilities of personal wealth.
But is it morally right that wealth be unequally allocated? One
answer is, of course it is: as John Locke put it, God intended that
the world be put to use by "the Industrious and Rational" and not
frittered away by the "Fancy or Covetousness of the Quarrelsom
[sic] and Contentious."57 That is to say, inequalities in wealth reflect
differences in talents and effort, and hence rewards to merit entail
inequality of wealth. There is a problem with this answer, though,
even supposing that rewards to merit are an appropriate measure
of morality, and even putting to one side the inexactness of the
merit/reward equation-particularly when the rewards go to heirs
rather than original earners. The problem is that this merit/reward
answer only kicks the question upstairs, as John Rawls famously
argued: inequalities in abilities and energy are themselves a matter
of luck, and on a reward-to-merit argument, luck gives no moral
claim even to the original earners, much less to their even luckier
55. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347 (1967) (detailing the role of property in internalizing externalities).
56. See THE FEDERAUST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(observing that it is contrary to "the first object of government" to remove the "diversity in
the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate" and from which unequal
kinds and quantities of property also emerge, even though these differences contribute to
political factions).
57. JOHN LoCKE, Second Treatise, in TwoTREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690).
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heirs. 58 Hence for the sake of justice in the allocation of resources,
those with greater talents and more energy might well be thought
obligated to share the results with the less-well-endowed.59
There are several responses to this critique. One is the libertar-
ian claim that things that are justly acquired and justly transferred
belong to the owner as a matter of right, and as such they are not
subject to redistribution without the owner's consent.60 This
assertion has considerable appeal, though it is subject to the issue
that Blackstone identified about acquisition: how can one show the
justice of the original acquisition?61
Perhaps even better-known, however, is the standard utilitarian
riposte that redistribution will kill the goose that lays the golden
eggs. Once again, property's moral subject is That Kind of Girl, and
not a saint. She minds the store and improves the things that are
hers so that she can enjoy the rewards, including the enjoyment
that she gets from giving things away to persons and causes of her
own choosing, rather than the choosing ofothers. Her efforts, taken
together with those of others like her, make the proverbial Pie
bigger for all,62 and they feed into the Rising Tide that Lifts All
Boats, as another proverbial phrase puts it.63 And wherever her
talents and energy may have come from, she is at least somewhat
less likely to exercise them if no rewards are forthcoming. Even
Rawls conceded something to the incentive structure implicit in
property: in his blindfolded "Original Position," in which partici-
pants do not know where they personally will come out in the
58. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72-74, 100-04 (1971).
59. Id. at 100-04.
60. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 151 (1974).
61. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
62. For a summary of the "pie" argument, see Carol M. Rose, "Enough, and as Good"of
What?, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 417, 417·22 (1987) (describing motivations of fictional character,
Rational Utility·Maximizer, or RUM); see also RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIvATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 3-6 (1985) (using the "pie" metaphor to set
up a theory of takings).
63. See, e.g., John C. Weicher, Private Production: Has the Rising Tide Lifted All &ats?,
in HOUSING AMERICA'S POOR 45 (peter D. Salins ed., 1987) (arguing that general housing
improvement also improves housing for the poor); ef Richard L. Kaplan, &anomie Inequality
and the Role of Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1987, 1989 (2003) (reviewing KEVIN PHILLIPS,
WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POUTICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RICH (2002» (attributing
to John F. Kennedy the saying "a rising tide lifts all boats," but disputing accuracy of the
idea).
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regime they are choosing, he thought people would choose to allow
the rich to get richer as long as their efforts made the poor some-
what richer toO.64 To put it in more of a vernacular style, the Goose
ofproperty may live, so long as its owners give an occasional Golden
Egg to nonowners.
Some in the Original Position might opt for an even riskier
strategy than Rawls suggested, preferring no giveaways of Golden
Eggs or pieces of the Pie at all, in the hopes that the no-give-away
strategy will result in an even bigger Pie. Those intrepid souls
might think that the probabilities for a slice of that bigger Pie
outweigh the chance of coming up short.65
But whatever their wishes, one can imagine another practical
reason for redistribution within a property regime. This reason
revolves around envy and resentment. Great disparities may arouse
jealousies among those at the bottom of the heap. Because by
definition the have-nots do not have much to lose, they can make a
credible threat to disrupt the institutions that protect the wealth of
the haves. That reasoning yields what Frank Michelman has called
the ''big-bribe'' theory of redistribution: give away something in
order to alleviate the threat.66 Bruce Johnsen's investigations of
Indian fishing communities in the Pacific Northwest suggest a big-
bribe motivation behind the potlatch,67 and Mark Roe's observations
on economic and political ''backlash'' suggest that a similar moti-
vation might be at work in more complex economies as well.68
64. See RAWLS, supra note 58, at 157 (noting that wealth disparities may be acceptable
if the least well-off are made at least slightly better oft).
65. Rose, supra note 62, at 418-20.
66. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self·Determination:
Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 154 (1977)
(describing rational economic motivation to pay for welfare as "big-bribe" to induce stability).
Note that ifproperty theorists are right, even have-nots have more than they would have in
state of nature, because their labor is a more valuable asset in a property regime. See
Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment, Economic Efficiency and the Lockean Proviso, 10 HARv. J.L.
&PuB. POL'y 401,407-08 (1987) (arguing that enclosure leaves even non-enclosers better off
because of greater productivity and higher labor value).
67. See D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and Protection ofProperty Rights Among the
Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 62-63 (1986) (attributing potlatch to
efforts to allay aggressiveness by neighboring groups whose fishing activities were less
successful).
68. Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1998) (suggesting that redistribution
of wealth may promote social stability, increasing overall economic welfare).
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Envy and resentment may not be the only practical re-
distributional motivations at work in a property regime, however.
Thomas Haskell argues that modern philanthropy began with the
vast expansion of commercial activity in the late eighteenth
century.69 According to this account, through trade, entrepreneurs
came to know and care something about people very different from
themselves, and they become convinced as well that they them-
selves had the power to intervene to improve the lot of others.70
That is to say, trade excited the moral sentiments, along with action
based on those sentiments.71
Philanthropy is not so far removed from involuntary redistribu-
tion, either, at least for That Kind of Girl, who is an Everyday
Kantian and a practitioner of a Middling Morality. She would like
to give away something to alleviate the troubles of the less fortu-
nate, but she does not want to be a sucker about it and be the only
one. If others feel the same way, a requirement of mandated
redistribution reassures the participants and becomes an entirely
plausible outcome in a regime that protects private property.
Perhaps in keeping with the middle-ground morality expected in
property regimes, property law takes a middling approach to
redistribution. Involuntary individual redistributions-such as
theft, robbery, and fraud-are everywhere sharply discouraged,
at least with respect to members of the in_group.72 Voluntary
individual redistributions in the form of gifts are more or less
unproblematic. The common law contains certain presumptions
against gifts-perhaps because gift-giving is not normally expected
in a second-best morality, or perhaps because what seems a
voluntary gift might be a larceny in disguise-but gifts are allow-
69. Thomas L. Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins ofthe Humanitarian Sensibility, Part
2,90 AM. HIST. REV. 547, 547, 554·59 (1985).
70. Id. at 555·58.
71. For Adam Smith's and other Enlightenment thinkers' location of"moral sentiments"
in interactions with others, see EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH,
CONDORCET, AND THE ENUGHTENMENT 230 (2001).
72. JOHN PHIUJP REID, LAWFORTHEELEPHANT: PROPERTYAND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE
OVERLAND TRAIL 350·55 (1997) (describing extreme level of respect for property among
westward emigrants, even under dire circumstances); cf. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & C. Leigh
Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions in the California Gold
Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114, 123, 135·37 (2001) (discussing strong concept of private
property but harassment of outsider ethnic groups among American gold rush miners).
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able if they jump through the requisite hoops to prove their
genuineness.73 Publicly mandated redistribution has a long history
-as in the potlatch-and no doubt serves in some measure as
mutual insurance,74 though in modern economies the mutual
insurance idea may be less convincing (does Donald Trump really
need welfare as insurance?). Modern economies generally put one
constraint on publicly mandated redistribution: it usually takes the
form of taxation-that is to say, payment falls on a large group.
''Takings'' law and similar doctrines constrain the degree to which
particular individuals can be forced to disgorge wealth for transfer
to the less fortunate, even though these doctrines differ from
country to country, and even though there may be some gentle
inclination toward redistribution implicit in takings law itself.75
This would comport with the second-best moral approach to
mandated redistribution: it is all right and perhaps even desirable
so long as a lot of people are involved, and no one person is the
sucker.
In sum, then, property law is not entirely hostile to redistribu-
tion, even mandatory redistribution, despite moral critiques to the
contrary. Spreading the burden is an important consideration, but
so is the potential cost to productivity entailed in reducing incen-
tives. But if a property regime really succeeds in harnessing self-
interest to labor, and if labor and effort really do contribute to
greater social wealth, then greater generosity may follow too.
Aristotle commented that even the liberal person pays attention to
his property so as to have enough to give to others, a view that may
73. Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become
Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 302-08 (1992) (noting
that promises to make gifts are enforced only with a special showing of the donor's intent).
74. Elizabeth I ofEngland attempted to deal with poverty by requiring the impoverished
person's original parish to provide for him or her. For the original Elizabethan Poor Law, see
An Act for the Reliefe of the Poore, 43 Eliz. c. 2 (1601) (Eng.). Other contemporary societies
provided poor relief as well, though poverty was not necessarily made pleasant. See, e.g.,
SIMON SCHAMA, THE EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES: AN INTERPRETATION OF DUTCH CULTURE
IN THE GOLDEN AGE 19·21, 174-75, 575·83 (1987) (describing seventeenth-century Dutch
charity for local poor persons along with much more draconian treatment of"idlers, spongers,
beggars and assorted ne'er·do-wells" considered able·bodied).
75. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 743-44, 747
(1999) (arguing that takings doctrine has redistributive element, particularly in subdoctrines
of reciprocal benefit and diminution of value).
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bear some relationship to the more modern idea of the diminishing
marginal utility of income or wealth. 76 Economists find that
environmental degradation in developing areas follows aU-shaped
"Kuznets curve," worsening at the outset of economic development
but then improving again as people's environmental interest
presumably rises along with their growing disposable incomes. 77
Even crows are generous with their neighbors when they have a lot
of food and numerous nesting spaces around.78 The very poor can
certainly show great generosity, and for the needy as well as others,
sharing can act as insurance in a very risky setting.79 But more
wealth may also foster more generosity, and if property regimes
succeed in producing wealthier societies, they may well add to the
sum total of generosity and motivation to redistribute.
C. Commodification
. Still another common moral complaint about property is that the
"propertization" and trade of some good things fatally misjudges
their character and undermines the good things themselves. "Love
for sale," for example, might be thought an expression that
misjudges the character oflove, and worse yet, one that undermines
people's ability to understand what love really is.80
76. ARISTOTLE, 4 Nichomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1768
(Jonathan Barnes ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1984). For an explanation of the declining
marginal utility of wealth, describing the idea but also some of its difficulties, see WALTER
J. BLUM & HARRyKALVEN,JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 40·41, 45·46,
51-54,56-63 (1953). Greater generosity, however, may reflect a shift in spending tastes with
greater wealth, rather than a declining marginal utility. [d. at 57 n.146.
77. Daniel C. Esty, Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 115,
119 (2001) (describing Kuznets curve in development-environment relationship and arguing
that even this pattern may be influenced to favor environment).
78. Jane E. Brody, The Too-Common Crow: Too Close for Comfort, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
1997, at Cl.
79. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1341-44 (1993) (analyzing
communal ownership as insurance·like response to high risk).
80. For a leading critique of the corrupting character of some commerce, see Michael J.
Sandel, What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAw AND CULTURE 122, 122-23 (Martha M.
Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (attacking commodification of some things as
corrupting).
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The commodification issue is basically an objection not to
property in general, but rather to a particular feature of property
rights, that is, alienability, and especially alienability through
sale.81 Some things, it is said, should not be treated as marketable
property, available for purchase by the highest bidder.82
As an aside, however, a considerable amount of property in the
world in fact is not alienable, not because of moral objections but
because the distribution of property rights make alienation
impracticable. The reason is complexity: large numbers of overlap-
ping rights in any given thing generally mean that this thing is
unlikely ever to be traded. In such cases, the costs of finding all the
owners and getting their consent precludes trade. Overlapping
rights can be a curse, as in the "tragedy of the anticommons," in
which the number and complexity of rights precludes commercial
development even of assets that are plainly adapted to commercial
uses, such as the storefronts in post-Soviet Moscow.83 Modern
intellectual property aims at utilitarian incentivizing, but IP too
can sprout overly complex property rights that impede socially
beneficial free availability, as in the patenting of upstream
scientific research84 or the "propertization" ofartistic productions.85
On the other hand, complex rights can also have some uses. They
are prevalent in many small-scale subsistence or community-
resource-based economies, such as precolonial New Zealand agricul-
ture86 and the medieval European open-field regimes.87 In those
81. Margaret Jane Radin, a leading scholar in the area, describes the issue of
commodification as "market alienability." See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1853 (1987).
82. [d. at 1855.
83. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-24 (1998) (describing inability of Moscow
storefront claimants to agree, freezing use).
84. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (arguing that upstream
patents complicate research efforts).
85. MatteI, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2002) (limiting
trademark in Barbie doll to permit song with critical social commentary).
86. Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century
New Zealand, 24 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 807,811-12 (1999).
87. Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (2000).
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close-knit groups, complexity may be favored by the participants;88
not only can complex rights stabilize the community by inhibiting
insiders' overreaching,89 but complexity also makes it hard for
outsiders to buy in and for insiders to sell out without the consent
of the whole community.90
Unlike past societies, modern economies-and their laws-tend
to treat alienability as one of the principal features of property, and
alienability necessarily much reduces complexity.91 Trade is a
matter ofimmense importance in modern economies, because trade
tends to move resources to those who value them most highly, and
because it encourages specialization on an ever-wider scale, which
vastly increases the total quantity of goods and services available.
Hence when something comes to be treated as property, trade-
ability is presumed, at least in modern economies. But in order to
be tradeable over wide circles of potential buyers, property must be
fairly simple as a legal matter, so that complete strangers have
some idea what they are getting. Thus there are many legal
doctrines that simplify property rights, even overriding the wishes
of the current owners for more delicate arrangements, so that
property will indeed be available for alienation-including alien-
ation to total strangers.92 In a wide and commercialized property
market, property law acts as an ax that purposely chops out
nuances and niceties in the things traded. Too many complications
spoil the market.
The formulaic, simplified legal patterns of alienable commercial
property are quite distinct from the exchange relations that occur
in more close-knit societies. In the latter, everyone knows in
detail whatever there is to know about who owns what in the
community. Exchanges may indeed be frequent, but they generally
take the form of reciprocal gifts. The relative values of these gifts
88. [d. at 153-54 (noting evidence that medieval and early modern farmers created
scattered fields and common property regimes by contract, evidently preferring this mode
to individual property rights).
89. [d. at 146·47.
90. [d. at 136·37; Banner, supra note 86, at 813·15, 817·20.
91. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 3·5 (2000) (noting that land and
other property can be conveyed only in one of a limited number of standard forms).
92. [d. at 24.
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go unstated, but they are implicitly understood by all the partici-
pants.93 Gift exchange cements community bonds-from a commu-
nity of two on up to many more-keeping all the participants in a
vague but nevertheless socially and emotionally charged condition
of mutual give and take.94
The contrast between the two patterns of exchange, if taken at
face value, does not speak very well for modern property regimes.
We observe delicate and subtle gift exchanges between intimates on
the one hand; but clunky, matter-of fact, rude, and explicit deals
between strangers on the other. The commodification objection is
that at least with respect to some subjects, we should limit
exchange relations to the former type of relationship and curtail the
latter.
Accordingly, the anticommodification subjects are often those
in which we commonly find a high level of personal or emotional
content. For example, according to some common anticommod-
ification claims, you might give your mother's wedding ring to your
daughter, to whom it could have special meaning, but it is a
horrible loss to have to sell it to a pawnbroker, who might resell it
to anyone at all. 95 You might give your kidney to your brother, but
you would sell a kidney to a stranger only under the direst threat
of poverty; moreover, your doing so might devalue and discourage
the altruistic donation of a kidney by a third party.96 You freely
exchange sexual favors with your lover, but selling sexual services
is a violation of human dignity, and doing so cheapens sexuality
93. MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC
SOCIETIES 1, 3, 40-41 (W.D. Halls trans., W.W. Norton 1990) (describing market·like
character of gift-exchange). For a more modem example, see Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SE'ITLE DISPUTES 55·56 (1991) (describing "[m]ental
[a]ccounting of [i]ntemeighbor [d]ebts" in close-knit community).
94. See Lee Anne Fennell, Unpacking the Gift: flliquid Goods and Empathetic Dialogue,
in THE QUESTION OFTHE GIFT: ESSAYSACROSS DISCIPLINES 85, 93-94 (Mark Osteen ed., 2002)
(arguing that gift giving differs from market exchange because through gifts, each party
engages in "imaginative participation in the life of the other," helping to cement
relationships).
95. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959-60
(1982) (noting difference in emotional attachment to ring as between "loving wearer" and
jeweler).
96. See Sandel, supra note 80, at 122-23 ("[C]ertain moral and civic goods are diminished
or corrupted if bought and sold for money.").
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more generally.97 At least, so goes the argument: commodification
coarsens subjects when intimacy and generosity are important, and
it reduces our ability even to understand their value. In that sense,
property-at least alienable property- corrupts the moral subject.
The philosopher Michael Sandel has been particularly adamant
about the dangers ofcommodification, and especially about the way
that commodification can corrupt the moral subject, who comes to
misjudge and devalue things that should at most be exchanged as
giftS.98 Sandel has also raised a related corruption issue about the
burgeoning use of property-like institutions in public regulation,
arguing that these undermine civic consciousness. For example, he
has opposed emission trades in connection with air pollution
control. These trades allow high-cost polluters to meet their cleanup
obligations by paying someone else-presumably someone with
lower prevention costs-to do the cleanup instead.99 The intuition
behind emission trading is that trading encourages substitute
performance, and substitute performance may reduce overall
pollution at the lowest cost, without respect to exactly where the
pollution reduction occurs and who actually does the reduction. But
in Sandel's view, this market arrangement corrupts the purchaser,
because it permits her to do something that is wrong simply
because she buys the right. 10o This corruption spreads to other
people as well: the purchase of a "right to pollute" sends the wrong
message about the wrongfulness ofpollution, and undermines those
who would try to do the right thing by reducing pollution as much
as possible. 101
There are several responses to these anticommodification
arguments, however. To begin with the more intimate subjects,
there is a certain prissiness about the claim, say, that sexuality is
best experienced in a situation of love and caring. Perhaps that is
true for some people (even most people), but some folks out there
like their sex a whole lot edgier, and the desired edginess might
97. Id. at 123.
98. Id. at 122·23.
99. Michael J. Sandel, It's Immoral To Buy the Right To Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1997, at A23.
100.Id.
101. Id. ("[TJurning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes the moral
stigma ... associated with it.").
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well include domination, humiliation, and yes, buying and selling. 102
Even putting to one side kinky preferences of this sort, there are
others who strongly resent public interference in their choices about
intimate matters, such as acquiring reproductive materials. Gays
and lesbians, long shut out by the disapproving regulations of
adoption and surrogacy, may well find the market a refreshing and
liberating alternative. l03
But for the second-best morality of property, none of these
grander liberationist claims for the market are really necessary.
Take the issue of prostitution. Let us concede, for the sake of
argument, the perhaps unadventurous view that first-best sexuality
and reproduction take place among loving partners in intimate
relationships. There still may be serious costs if sexuality is limited
to these circumstances. Whether we like it or not, sexuality is likely
to get marketed because some people do not have better options. l04
A property-based, second-best solution would be to take these
frailties into account and try to make the best of them. What would
that mean? Itwould mean taking seriously the prostitute's property
in her body and her contractual interests in dealing with it. 105 That
is to say, it would make sure that her contracts are enforceable and,
most importantly, that she gets paid.106 Otherwise she may have to
use a pimp for enforcement and/or payoff corrupt cops, and she
may find getting out of "the trade" a whole lot more difficult and
time-consuming, supposing that she wishes to do SO.107 Illegalizing
the sale of sexual services makes her much more vulnerable to
these kinds of individuals, encouraging their overreaching and her
dependency, hardly a scenario for moral uplift. lOB Illegality has of
102. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 181,206-07 (2001) (noting that sexuality may take edgy forms, including
objectification).
103. See Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and
Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 35-37 (2003) (arguing for a more
open market in reproductive materials).
104. See Sandel, supra note 80, at 123.
105. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 276-85,291-93 (1999) (describing
and refuting arguments against prostitutes' contracting for sexual services).
106. Id. at 278.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 294 (noting that pimps' control of prostitutes' earnings may be exacerbated by
illegality).
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course been the choice of many jurisdictions, though one might well
doubt its humaneness, and one might certainly doubt whether such
choices lead to enhanced welfare for any of the concerned parties.
Even St. Augustine thought legality the better route, largely for
second-best reasons. 109
At this juncture, the usual second-best considerations--doing
well in the long run, even at the cost of some concession to human
frailty-begin to raise a moral claim of their own vis-a-vis the first-
besters. Where does the superior moral position really lie? Pushing
even further and really insisting on the first-best solution, that no
sex should occur outside a loving relationship, could mean that the
prostitute starves to death. The same may be said of those who sell
kidneys and other body parts. How moral is this? That question,
by the way, is no doubt one reason why one of the more sober
anticommodificationists, Margaret Radin, thinks that with respect
to dire circumstances of this sort, there can be no complete anti-
commodification position without a commitment to welfare.no
In a second-best moral universe the welfare solution could have
considerable appeal, because it at least recognizes the prostitute or
the kidney-seller as a property-holding agent, who has to be paid to
do something different with her property from what she might have
otherwise preferred. Ofcourse, those who pay the welfare tab might
be concerned about the impact on incentives; transfer payments
that are too large might even encourage some to threaten to sell
kidneys or sex just for the sake of the expected payoff. Donors could
well give generously to these laudable ends, but they do not want
to be suckers. As usual, the second-best moral subjects presumed
by property are capable of thoughtful and cooperative activity, but
they respond to incentives; what is more, they know that others do
as well, and they think it is asking for trouble to forget it. lll Sale of
intimate goods thus takes on a rather different hew when seen
through the lens ofproperty as a second-best morality: considerably
109. St. Augustine, De Ordine 2.12, in 5 THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 227, 287-88
(Ludwig Schopp ed., Robert P. Russell trans., Catholic Univ. ofAm. Press 1948) (saying that
prostitution is an evil, but that it cannot be eradicated without great unsettlement, due to
human lust).
110. Radin, supra note 81, at 1910-11.
111. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
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more sympathy for those who trade in these goods, considerably
less sympathy for the effort to suppress them, and some interest in
the welfare-buy-out option along with some scepticism about its
efficacy.
Although the context is very different, the anticommodification
position raises similar second-best considerations when the issue
comes to the use of finite resources, as in clean air. No doubt the
moral stricture against polluting would be a good thing if there
were no cost to halting pollution. But as with the curtailment of
prostitution or kidney sales, there are costs, even though they may
not be so searingly personaL When the no-pollution option has real
costs, such as in making electricity prohibitively expensive, it is
questionable whether a strictly "moral" antipollution position is
very sensible. Pollution does indeed damage important aspects of
social welfare, but without polluting activities it would be impossi-
ble to have some good things-electricity for refrigeration for foods
and medicines, lights for libraries and theaters, and many, many
other benefits. Considered only from the perspective ofpollution vel
non, the first-best moral ideal would presumably be no pollution at
all; but from a wider perspective, no pollution would cost a great
deaL Left to herself, That Kind of Girl just isn't that good.
To be fair to Michael Sandel, he apparently does not presume
that she is. He just thinks that she should avoid "excessive"
pollution, and that if others are buying and selling pollution
entitlements, she is likely to become discouraged,112 and thus less
likely to make the effort to reduce excesses. In his view, this kind
of buying and selling sends the wrong message, namely that
something morally wrong is not an evil but simply an expense.113
What is really under discussion here, then, is the kind of
entitlement that will most efficaciously keep a necessary evil within
some kind of boundaries. Some property regimes certainly insist
that actors behave in the ways that Sandel suggests. In nuisance
law or riparian law, everyone is supposed to behave "reasonably,"
which generally means that each person can act in a way that is
compatible with like activities of everyone else, a sort of practical
112. Sandel, supra note 99.
113. Id.
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Golden Rule. 114 But regimes of this sort often emerge where there
are relatively high transactions costs among the participants. Here
courts require "reasonable" behavior because the parties cannot
easily bargain for their more precise preferences.115 When transac-
tions become less costly, or when the parties' preferences become
more important to them, they often start to cut deals.116 Why?
Because there are often gains from trade: the low-value water user,
for example, can trade his "reasonable" diversion rights to the
higher-value user, and both are better off. Tradeable emission
allowances lower the cost of trades by defining property rights, and
once that is done, there certainly appear to be gains from trade here
too, with lower-cost pollution preventers selling permits to higher-
cost preventers, while the rest of us come out with less pollution
and at a lower total social cost. 117
Pollution trading may reduce more pollution for less money, but
is that good enough to justify the moral degradation of the partici·
pants? An important question here, however, is whether there
really is much of a moral loss. Undoubtedly there is some loss,
under some circumstances--or at least the claim is arguable. In a
much-cited study of an Israeli daycare center, parents apparently
were failing to pick up their children on time, much to the distress
of the staff, who wanted to get home themselves. 118 When the staff
instituted a fine for laggards, however, the parents began to regard
the arrangement as a fee for service, and they left the kids late even
more often. 119
That Kind of Girl, however, might see a different opportunity
here: why not take the money from fines (or fees), hire a babysitter
114. See, e.g., Middlesex Co. v. McCue, 21 N.E. 230, 231 (Mass. 1889) (finding that
ordinary use of land was not a nuisance). For riparian rights, see Carol M. Rose, Energy and
Efficiency in the Realignment ofCommon·Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 284-85
(1990) (associating riparian law with reasonable correlative rights).
115. Rose, supra note 114, at 285.
116. See id. at 281 (noting riparian owners' complex transactions concerning water power
for industrial purposes).
117. For a well·known statement of the trading gains from emission rights systems, see
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1333, 1341-42 (1985).
118. See Uri Gneezy & AIdo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2000).
119. Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 339·40 (2001)
(citing Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 118, at 15) (arguing that fine increased parent
tardiness rather than discouraged it).
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to stay late with the kids, and make everybody happy while
creating a new job for someone? Would it be better ifall the parents
did the right thing? Well, maybe. But if they do not, enlightened
self-interest might be able to come up with satisfactory solutions.
First-best actors could enjoy their halos, but they would miss out on
some opportunities, such as providing a job for somebody else.
A more important point is that it is not altogether clear that
people do in fact respond worse to fees-for-service than they do to
expectations of what might be thought to be "good" behavior.
Industries have long griped and moaned under the requirements of
command-and-control environmental rules, which are themselves
a variant on the stricture that everyone should do the right thing,
or at least the very best they can.120 Even putting to one side the
expense and misdirection of some command-and-control regula-
tions,121 industrialists' evasions and prevarications about these
controls are not a thing of moral beauty. Using an example from the
express "diamond" lanes of a California highway, Lior Strahilevitz
has interestingly described the normative response that motorists
made to a change from command-and-control to market mecha-
nisms.122 When the rules permitted only multiple-passenger
vehicles to use the express lanes, single-passenger motorists
responded with rampant cheating and resentment. But cheating
dropped precipitously when the system changed, and when drivers
were simply charged extra to use the fast lane.123 Apparently both
those who paid and those who did not thought that the allocation
was fair: you pay your money and you get your lane. And by the
way, the money could be used for transportation improvement, or
even environmental protection. Is this immoral? Perhaps for the
Utopian, but not necessarily for That Kind of Girl.
120. See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin & Neela Bannerjee, Some Energy Executives Urge U.S.
Shift on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I, 2001, at C1 (describing energy industry
opposition to proposed mandate for all power plants to employ modem emissions-reductions
technology, and describing industry preference for tradeable pollution credits).
121. See, e.g., J.B. Rubl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 817 (2003) (calling for
global view in environmental regulation, discussing overregulation of one source of air
pollution and underregulation of another).
122. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social
Norms: Commodifying California's Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231 (2000).
123. Id. at 1250-52, 1256-60.
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The California highway experience suggests a more general point
about anticommodification and antiproperty claims: even though for
the sake of getting on with things, property regimes may overlook
some lacunae in the justification of entitlements, nevertheless, in
many or perhaps most instances people think property arrange-
ments and markets are fair. Indeed, the medieval philosophic
tradition of the "just price" used the market price as a normal
gauge.124 Most people do not behave with their property or in
markets in the cold, calculating, and utterly self-serving ways that
anticommodificationists and more general antiproperty theorists
suggest.125 If they did, markets would not last very long, and
property probably would not either. People have to accept property
for it to work in any meaningful way. And, very often, they do,
relieving owners of the onerous necessity to guard their things all
the time.126 Whatever the lapses, property regimes generally
mediate issues of resource use and discourage feuds while encour-
aging trades instead. As to trade, people meet others in market
relationships; they learn to trust one another and to behave in
trustworthy ways, and out of those relationships of trust they can
develop general habits of civility and more specific friendships,
sometimes quite remarkable ones. 127 Property accepts people as
they generally are--self-interested, to be sure, but capable of
cooperation-and of course it leverages both traits into productive
activity.
By contrast, it is the Utopian, first-best demand-the demand
that insists on sharing and that concommitantly severely limits
property-that puts inordinate strains on That Kind of Girl. As a
result, although there are some utopian successes such as monas-
teries, the history of utopian experiments is littered with moral
124. James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1604 (1981).
125. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 11·14 and accompanying text.
127. See Peter Kollock, The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study
of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust, 100 AM. J. SOC. 313, 337-38 (1994) (describing
experimental study of relationship-building through trade).
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failure and sometimes great cruelty.128 Shops in socialist regimes
are renowned for the rudeness and indifference of their clerks.
Why should they care? They get nothing from good behavior. The
Anabaptists at Muenster fell into mutual recriminations, and they
ultimately betrayed and killed one another.129 Perhaps the greatest
of all utopian experiments was the old Soviet Union, and according
to one eminent Soviet historian, Richard Pipes, the experiment led
to unprecedented listlessness, arbitrariness, corruption, and moral
slackness. 130
This is not to say that private property regimes are all sweetness
and light. They are not. They have more than their share of trouble
makers, hucksters and advantage-takers. But those kinds ofpeople
are not the normal subjects of property, and they are certainly not
the ideal type supposed by property law. When they can be caught,
they are treated with disapprobation. The normal subject instead
is the kind of person who is self-seeking enough to get herself into
plenty of Prisoners' Dilemmas, but generous enough to get herself
out of them when dealing with a similarly generous counterpart. 131
Economic thinkers have come to realize that this kind of person
is a great source of wealth-production-much more so than the
purely saintly type. Economic success often serves as the rationale
for ignoring the unsolvable issues of entitlement and distribution
that dog property regimes. But moral thinkers might well consider
that this kind of person, the normal subject of property, is also
worthy ofsome respect. This is not because she is perfect, which she
is not, and not simply because her characteristics are so productive,
which they are, but because she has her own streak of divinity. It
is a streak that, although wary, is still trustful, trustworthy, and
good-willed-all traits that can be enhanced by institutions that
recognize that, in this vale of tears, second-best may be the best
that we can do.
128. See supra notes 4·6 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
130. See generally Richard Pipes, Human Nature and the Fall of Communism, AM. ACAD.
ARTS & SCI. BULL., Jan. 1996, at 38.
131. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
